Delict in Scotland in 2012 by Hogg, Martin
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delict in Scotland in 2012
Citation for published version:
Hogg, M 2013, 'Delict in Scotland in 2012' European Tort Law Yearbook, vol 2012, pp. 577-608.,
10.1515/etly.2013.3.1.577
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1515/etly.2013.3.1.577
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
European Tort Law Yearbook
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Hogg, M. (2013). Delict in Scotland in 2012. European Tort Law Yearbook, 2012, 577-608.
10.1515/etly.2013.3.1.577
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Scotland  577 
 
Martin Hogg 
XVIV. Scotland 
Martin Hogg Scotland 
 
A. Legislation 
 
There is nothing to report by way of new legislation in the field of delict this 
year. 
 
 
B. Cases 
 
1. Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd (and 
conjoined action), Court of Session Inner House, 8 June 
2012, [2012] CSIH 52: Bringing Regularity and Consistency 
to Jury Awards of Damages in Cases of Death and Personal 
Injury; Judicial Guidance to Juries in making such Awards 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
In two actions considered together by a five judge appeal bench of the Court of 
Session, defenders against whom awards had been made for ‘loss of society’ 
under the Damages (Scotland) Act 19761 appealed against the awards made as 
being excessive, and enrolled motions for new trials. In each case, the level  
of damages had been determined by a civil jury following a trial of the evi- 
dence, damages in the first case being set at £ 142,060 and in the second at 
£ 90,000. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The five members of the appeal bench unanimously held the two awards to be 
excessive, and ordered a new trial in each case. Of more general significance, 
 
_____ 
1 Loss of society awards are available to specified relatives of family members killed as a 
result of delictual conduct. The 1976 Act has now been superseded by the Damages (Scotland) 
Act 2011, discussed in M Hogg, Scotland, European Tort Law (ETL) 2011, 555, no 1.  
1 
2 
3 
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the court considered the issue of how greater consistency in jury awards might 
be achieved. The Lord President of the Court proposed that, for the future, 
judges should address the jury as to the spectrum of reasonable awards which 
might be made on the facts of the particular case before them. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
The specific disposal of the two cases before the court was not the signifi- 
cant feature of these conjoined cases. What was significant was that the 
Court of Session has finally grappled with the nettle of the wide variance in 
damages awards handed down by juries in cases of death and personal in-
jury. A five member appeal bench had been specially convened to give added 
weight to the court’s judgment (three being the standard size of the appeal 
bench).  
In the lengthy leading judgment, the Lord President of the Court narrates 
the controversy surrounding excessive and widely varying damages awards 
made by juries. He sets this controversy within an historical analysis of the dif-
ferent approaches to the use of jury trials in Scotland and England. Civil jury 
trials came rather late to Scots law, as the Lord President narrates: 2 
 
The Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1815 introduced to Scotland civil jury trials upon the model 
of what had long been established in England and Wales.  
 
Scotland’s introduction of the civil jury trial had brought a degree of harmony to 
Scots and English practice for some considerable time. But things changed in 
the middle of the twentieth century: 3 
 
In England and Wales trial of personal injury actions by juries was effectively abolished 
by judicial decision in the 1960s.  
 
Thereafter, in England civil awards of damages by juries were replaced by the 
judicial determination of awards by reference to a judicially evolved scale for 
such awards. This led to greater uniformity in English cases, but not in Scots 
ones.  
 
_____ 
2 Para 37. 
3 Para 46. His Lordship referred to this development as stemming from the new practice 
founded on the approach set out in Sims v William Howard & Son Ltd [1964] 2 Law Reports, 
Queen’s Bench (QB) 409. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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In this case, the Inner House accepted that the time for change had arrived 
in Scotland. The court did not, however, wish to abolish civil jury trials in per-
sonal injury cases, accepting the recognised significance and importance of jury 
determination of awards in the Scottish legal tradition. In this regard, the Lord 
President quoted4 from an earlier judgment of the Court of Session from 1988, in 
which it had been said that: 
 
the ‘overall philosophy’ of Scottish practice is that the assessment of damages is first and 
foremost a matter for a jury. We, ourselves, might go further and suggest that it is this very 
philosophy which gives to awards of damages in this area their essential legitimacy. These 
awards, as it seems to us, should in the end reflect the expectation of the society which 
the legal profession serves and represents, rather than be simply an invention of that pro-
fession. 
 
Rather than abolishing civil jury awards, the Lord President suggests the  
following new procedure of judicial guidance to juries on appropriate damages 
awards: 5 
 
‘There was a broad consensus that, at the conclusion of the evidence, the parties should, 
in the absence of the jury, briefly address the trial judge on their suggestions as to the 
level of non-pecuniary damages which would be appropriate. In light of these submis-
sions and having regard to his own experience and judgment, the trial judge would, in 
addressing the jury, suggest to them a spectrum within which their award might lie. That 
spectrum, he would inform them, was for their assistance only; it was not binding on 
them.’  
 
His Lordship added that, it may be that in time rules of court could be devised to 
fix the procedural aspects of the new process, but that this possible develop-
ment need not hinder the immediate implementation of the proposed changes.6 
The outcome of this case is a radically new, judicially mandated procedure 
for the determination of jury awards in cases of personal injury and death, one 
designed to ensure consistency in awards and the avoidance of excessive 
awards. Whether these aims will be achieved will doubtless be disclosed in the 
coming years.  
 
 
 
_____ 
4 Para 47 (the quotation is from the judgment of the Court in Shaher v British Aerospace Flying 
College Limited 2003 Session Cases (SC) 540). 
5 Para 76. 
6 Para 78. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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2. Kirkham v Link Housing Group Ltd, Court of Session Inner 
House, 4 July 2012, [2012] CSIH 58: Liability of Occupier of 
Premises for Injuries Sustained as a Result of Occupier’s 
Failure to Inspect and Correct Uneven Paving Stones 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
In December 2006 the pursuer tripped and fell on uneven paving stones on her 
garden path, injuring her shoulder. Neither the pursuer nor her landlords, the 
defenders, had known of any danger on account of uneven paving stones on the 
path. The pursuer sued the defenders in both contract and delict. A trial of the 
facts took place in February 2010. Damages were agreed at £ 92,393. Ultimately, 
however, the defenders were found not liable in law for such damages. The pur-
suer appealed against that decision. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The appeal court held, in relation to the claim in delict, that the defenders had 
not been in breach of their statutory duty (under secs 1 and 2 of the Occupiers 
Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, ‘the 1960 Act’) to take such care as was in all the 
circumstances of the case reasonable to see that any person entering on to their 
property (including the pursuer) would not suffer injury or damage by reason of 
any danger which was due to the state of the property (or anything done or 
omitted to be done on the property). As the defenders had not known of the 
danger, the pursuer could only succeed in her claim if she were able to show a 
breach of the defenders’ duty of care because, for instance, they had failed to set 
up an adequate system of inspection or had failed properly to implement a sys-
tem of inspection already in place. The Inner House agreed with the judge at 
first instance that the pursuer had not proven a failure on the defenders’ part of 
such a sort. Accordingly, the appeal was refused. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
Occupiers’ liability in delict has in Scotland, since 1960, been a statutory matter, 
governed by the 1960 Act, but it is to be noted that this Act does not establish a 
strict standard of liability: the liability of occupiers (such as landlords of prop-
erty) remains fault-based, the standard of care being that narrated in the imme-
diately preceding paragraph. In cases where a landlord has a danger reported to 
12 
13 
14 
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it, and fails to correct the defect within a reasonable time, it will be reasonably 
easy to demonstrate a breach of the duty of care. But in cases where this has not 
happened, unless the danger is so patent that it ought to have been obvious to 
the landlord, recourse will likely be necessary (as in this case) to an allegation 
that the landlord did not have a suitable inspection regime in place by virtue of 
which dangers could periodically be identified.  
The problem for the pursuer in this case with such an allegation was that she 
had failed to specify what an adequate system of inspection would have amounted 
to. Without such specification, the court had no standard by which it could judge 
the adequacy or inadequacy of the system that was in place (the specification of 
which was also lacking in detail). Lady Paton (delivering the judgment of the Inner 
House) noted that this difficulty had been highlighted by the judge at first in-
stance, who had said that the ‘evidence about the ad hoc system of inspection and 
the frequency of visits to properties was vague. There was no satisfactory evidence 
as to what a reasonable inspection of common parts or a reasonably diligent im-
plementation of the ad hoc system would have amounted to.’7 The problem caused 
by a failure to specify what sort of management system a defender should have 
had in place in order to discharge a duty incumbent upon it was highlighted in last 
year’s Yearbook in relation to the case of Campbell v Borders Health Board,8 in 
which a pursuer’s claim for damages against a health authority failed for lack of 
specification of the sort of system for dealing with patients of her class which 
the authority ought to have had in place. That this problem has arisen again in 
this case indicates that pleaders appear not to have appreciated the courts’ in-
sistence on the importance of such specification in cases in which the essence of 
a pursuer’s delictual claim is alleged to be the poor management of risk.  
In this case, it might be that a simple plea that an ad hoc system of repairs 
was inadequate, and that, say, a quarterly system of inspection of all properties 
in the landlords’ portfolio should have been implemented, would have im-
proved the pursuer’s chances of success.9  
 
_____ 
7 Cited in the judgment of the Inner House at para 32.  
8 [2011] CSOH 73.  
9 In the tenancy agreement between the parties, the landlords had agreed to inspect the 
‘Common Parts’ at ‘reasonable intervals’, though as the pursuer’s garden path was not one of 
the defined Common Parts it is somewhat difficult to assess to what extent a court might 
properly have had regard to the ‘reasonable intervals’ requirement in the agreement when 
considering the appropriate frequency of any competent system of inspection for the purposes 
of a duty of care in delict in relation to the garden path.  
15 
16 
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3. Anton v South Ayrshire Council and North Ayrshire Council, 
Court of Session Outer House, 11 May 2012, [2012] CSOH 
80: Whether Liability to make Reparation in Delict 
Transmitted from a Local Authority to its Successor 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer in this action was the widow of a man who had died from meso-
thelioma contracted as a result (it was averred) of the inhalation of asbestos 
during the course of his employment between 1948 and 1971 by a local author-
ity, Ayr County Council, which had been dissolved in a local government reor-
ganisation of 1975. The statutory functions of Ayr County Council were, during 
various subsequent local government reorganisations, transferred to a number 
of successor bodies, until eventually being taken over in 1996 by the defenders 
(in both of whose present territorial areas the deceased had worked whilst em-
ployed by Ayr County Council). The deceased had not developed symptoms of 
mesothelioma until 2007.10 The pursuer sued the defenders for damages in 
delict in respect of the death of the deceased. The defenders argued that no li-
ability which Ayr County Council might have had in respect of the death of the 
pursuer’s husband had transmitted to any successor local authority. 
The question of the transmissibility of any liability turned primarily upon 
the interpretation of the legislation effecting the original transfer of Ayr County 
Council’s liabilities, the Local Authorities etc (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scot-
land) Order 1975,11 regulation 3 (1) of which provided that:  
 
All rights, liabilities and obligations which, immediately before 16th May 1975, were 
rights, liabilities and obligations of an existing local authority shall on that date, by virtue 
of this order, be transferred to and vest in the new authority … 
 
The question for the court was whether, immediately before 16 May 1975,  
Ayr County Council was under any ‘liabilities’ or ‘obligations’ to the deceased in 
delict which might transmit to its statutory successor(s). The defenders argued 
that, as the deceased had not suffered from any illness in 1975 in respect of 
which he might at that time have sued Ayr County Council, the defenders had 
been under no liability or obligation to him capable of being transmitted to the 
 
_____ 
10 The date of his death is not recited in the judgment. 
11 And subsequent legislation, namely the Local Government (Transitional Financial Provi-
sions) (Scotland) Order 1996. 
17 
18 
19 
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defenders. For any such liability or obligation to have been in existence, there 
would (as recognised in important previous judgments such as Rothwell v 
Chemical Insulating Co Ltd12) have had to have been a concurrence of both in-
juria (an act or omission giving rise to liability) and damnum (harm), but no 
harm had been caused until the emergence of the deceased’s mesothelioma. 
The law of delict did not recognise any such notion as ‘contingent liability’ 
which might be transmitted under the relevant legislation. By contrast, the pur-
suer argued that, looking to the history and purpose of legislation dealing with 
local government since the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1889, ‘liabilities’ 
should be interpreted to include liabilities to which (in the words of the 1889 
Act) ‘any authority are or would be, but for the passing of this Act, liable or sub-
ject, whether accrued due at the date of the transfer by this Act, effected or sub-
sequently accruing’. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Giving judgment, Lady Clark held that: (i) there was no existing cause of action 
on the part of the deceased against Ayr County Council immediately before 
16 May 1975; (ii) it would be inappropriate to interpret ‘liabilities’ in the broad 
sense argued for by the pursuer by reference to the terms of the 1889 Act; (iii) 
the terms ‘liabilities’ and ‘obligations’ in the 1975 Order were not synonymous; 
(iv) the word ‘liabilities’ in the 1975 Order did not necessarily or obviously have 
the restricted meaning of liabilities which could be immediately sued upon (if it 
did, then contingent contractual liabilities would be unable to be transferred); 
(v) in two previous cases (one Scots, one English), liability had been held to 
transmit in respect of claims in which the damage had not begun to manifest 
itself until after the date of transmission; (vi) while a concurrence of damnum 
and injuria was required before a claim in delict could be raised, it could well be 
the case that there might be several years between the concurrence of the two 
elements. Considering all of these matters, Lady Clark held that the word ‘li-
abilities’ had a meaning which was wide enough in scope to cover potential li-
abilities in delict. She held this to be consistent with the historical observation 
that the 
 
reorganisation of local government was a complicated statutory exercise but it was no part 
of the purpose of the resultant legislation to take away remedies from individuals which 
 
_____ 
12 [2008] 1 Appeal Cases (AC) 281. 
20 
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they would have had but for the reorganisation. In the present case, but for the reorgani-
sation, the pursuers would have had a remedy against Ayr County Council for the death of 
the deceased if that local authority had not ceased to exist as a result of local government 
reorganisation. 
 
In consequence, Lady Clark held the pursuer entitled to proceed with her action 
against the defenders and ordered a further procedural hearing to be held to de-
termine the appropriate method for the litigation to proceed through the courts. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
There has been much litigation, as well as some legislation, in Scotland and 
England in recent years in relation to liability for asbestos-related injuries, some 
of which has been reported in recent Yearbooks. Importantly, Scottish public 
and parliamentary opinion has been in favour of ensuring that employers who 
have exposed employees to asbestos dust should not be allowed to escape from 
liability on account of what are perceived (rightly or wrongly) as ‘legal niceties’. 
Judicial decisions which have stood in the way of recovery have met with par-
liamentary action: the denial of joint and several liability in respect of meso-
thelioma in Barker v Corus13 resulted in the restoration of such liability in sec 3 
of the (UK) Compensation Act 2006; the denial of liability for pleural plaques in 
Rothwell v Chemical Insulation (referred to no 19 above) resulted, in Scotland at 
least, in a parliamentary reversal of that position in the Damages (Asbestos-
related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. While there is no suggestion that Lady 
Clark’s judgment in this case was in any way reached with the pressure of such 
public opinion in mind, it was doubtless met with a general sense of approba-
tion in wider society.  
So much for the general background to the decision. As for the judgment it-
self, Lady Clark faced a difficult interpretative question. There was not a great 
deal of useful precedent to assist the determination of the word ‘liabilities’ 
within the specific statutory context before the court. Indeed, in search of the 
correct answer, her Ladyship went so far even as to raise with counsel in the 
case the idea of a possible Hohfeldian interpretation of the term.14 However, as 
 
_____ 
13 [2006] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 20. 
14 A Hohfeldian exploration of the meaning of liabilities might have been interesting, given 
that Hohfeld distinguishes the right-duty pairing of jural correlatives from the power-liability 
pairing: see WN Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reason-
ing (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal (Yale LJ) 16. However, if we were to accept that ‘liabilities’ in the 
21 
22 
23 
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she dryly remarked in her judgment, ‘there appeared little enthusiasm by par-
ties to pursue this jurisprudential analysis’.15 Quite possibly, as her Ladyship 
noted, the reason for the uncertainty surrounding the issue of whether contin-
gent liabilities were intended to be covered was that ‘the problem was over-
looked by parliamentary draftsmen’.16 Whatever the reason for an absence of 
legislative elucidation of the concept of ‘liabilities’, Lady Clark’s three main rea-
sons for her decision require some comment, these being: (i) the support for her 
decision provided in two prior judgments which seemed to be of some rele-
vance; (ii) the purposes underlying the reorganisation of local government and 
its facilitative legislation; and (iii) the idea that, even though it is only where 
injuria and damnum coincide that there can be an ‘obligation’,17 one may still 
have (contingent) ‘liability’ prior to such concurrence, and that such contingent 
liability was sufficient to trigger the legislative transfer provision.  
As to the first of these reasons – the authority provided by the Scots case of 
Downie v Fife Council18 and the English decision Walters v Babergh DC19 – the 
first case, Downie, was evidently the more pertinent, as it dealt with the same 
provision as that before Lady Clark and the same question of the transfer of li-
abilities to a successor local authority. In that case, the alleged transfer of li-
abilities had taken place in 1996 but no physical symptoms of illness (damnum) 
had manifested themselves until 1997. Given the court’s finding in favour of a 
transfer of liabilities, the case appeared to support the idea that provisional li-
abilities can be transferred under the legislation. The difficulty with the case is 
that the question of the non-concurrence of injuria and damnum was not raised 
before the court or specifically considered by the judge. Nonetheless, given the 
timing of the pursuer’s illness in Downie and the consequent effect that what 
was transferred, at the relevant time, was therefore only a contingent liability, 
reliance on the case by Lady Clark does not seem improper. The Walters case, 
 
_____ 
legislative provision before the court created the Hohfeldian sense of a ‘power’ vested in the 
deceased at the time of the transfer of Ayr County Council’s demise, it is difficult to see exactly 
what ‘power’ the deceased might be thought to have had. At that point, he was merely 
someone who had been exposed to asbestos. He might or might not have gone on to contract 
mesothelioma (many exposed people never contract mesothelioma), but at the relevant date 
we would not know into which category he fell, so could not know whether he had any ‘power’ 
(of future litigation, perhaps?) or not.  
15 Para 49. 
16 Para 45. 
17 Para 38. 
18 2001 SC 793. 
19 (1983) 82 Local Government Reports (LGR) 235. 
24 
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dealing with similar though not identical legislation, did give rise to specific 
judicial approval by Woolf J of the idea that contingent liabilities were intended 
to be included within the legislative ambit:  
 
‘I do not think that the meaning of the word [liabilities] can be limited … to a present, en-
forceable liability, excluding any contingent or potential liability. Used simpliciter, the 
word seems to me to be fully capable of embracing the latter form of liability’20  
 
Lady Clark’s observations as to the purposes of local government reorganisation 
(quoted above) also seem pertinent. However, her Ladyship’s third supportive 
reason for the decision takes us into the more difficult waters of legal theory and 
fundamental obligational language discussed at the beginning of this article. 
‘Obligations’ and ‘liabilities’, she tells us, are not synonyms: ‘obligations’ can 
only arise when there is a concurrence of damnum and injuria;21 by contrast, 
liabilities may be contingent or potential, and may arise where there is injuria 
but, as yet, no damnum. While such a conclusion supported her decision, it is 
unclear what if anything justifies this view that obligations may not be contin-
gent, but liabilities may. As the discussion in relation to the next discussed case 
will show, there is authority from the Scottish Institutional Writers indicating 
that ‘obligations’ may indeed be described as contingent. Her Ladyship might 
alternatively have held that both obligations and liabilities can be contingent 
(such a conclusion would equally have supported her decision), though that 
would of course have begged the question as to what then distinguishes the two 
concepts (and the inclusion of both terms in the relevant legislation certainly 
suggested a difference). One answer might have been to suggest that ‘obliga-
tion’ was intended to mean an interpersonal legal bond or tie (the first sense of 
obligation discussed above), whereas ‘liability’ was intended to mean any legal 
responsibility, not necessarily one deriving from such an interpersonal bond 
(so, statutory liabilities would be covered). On such an approach, an obligation 
or a liability would be different things, though each could be either uncondi-
tional or contingent, as the circumstances required. 
Despite concerns about this last of Lady Clark’s three reasons, her other two 
reasons make out a reasonable case for the conclusion reached. However, in the 
next case discussed, Bavaird, the judge reached the opposite conclusion in a 
quite similar case, thereby throwing this whole issue of the transfer of contin-
gent liabilities into doubt. 
 
_____ 
20 Walters v Babergh DC (1983) 82 LGR 235, per Woolf J. 
21 Para 38. 
25 
26 
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4. Bavaird v Sir Robert MacAlpine Ltd & others, Court of 
Session Outer House, 5 October 2012, [2012] CSOH 157: 
Whether Liability to make Reparation in Delict, for Death 
Caused as a Result of Mesothelioma, Transmitted from a 
Local Authority to its Successor 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The executors of the estate of a deceased individual, together with various of his 
family members, sued his former employers, the defenders, including one de-
fender (South Lanarkshire Council) which was the statutory successor of a pre-
vious employer, the East Kilbride Development Corporation (‘EKDC’). The pur-
suers averred that the deceased had died in 2008 from mesothelioma contracted 
as a result of the inhalation of asbestos in the course of his various periods of 
employment by the defenders. The issue for the court was exactly the same as in 
the previous case of Anton22 (discussed in no 17 ff above), namely whether or not 
the successor local authority had had transmitted to it any liability to make 
reparation to the pursuers in respect of the deceased’s death. As in Anton, the 
pursuers argued that the liabilities transferred to EKDC included contingent li-
ability to make reparation for the deceased’s death.  
In this case, the relevant provision effecting the transfer of liabilities to 
EKDC was regulation 2 of the New Town (East Kilbride) (Transfer of Property, 
Rights and Liabilities) Order 1996 (‘the 1996 Order’), which provided that ‘[a]ny 
property, rights or liabilities of the development corporation’ were to vest in 
South Lanarkshire Council. 
As in the Anton case, EKDC argued that there was no delictual liability to-
wards the deceased extant at the relevant date of transfer: such liability could 
arise only upon the concurrence of damnum and injuria (reference was again 
made to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rothwell). The pursuers argued that at 
the relevant time EKDC owed the deceased a contingent liability, and that such 
liability had been transferred to EKDC under the relevant legislative provision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____ 
22 Anton v South Ayrshire Council [2012] CSOH 80. 
27 
28 
29 
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b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Lord Brailsford gave judgment in favour of South Ayrshire Council. While regu-
lation 2 of the 1996 Order transferred all liabilities of EKDC on the relevant date, 
a ‘liability’ properly so styled involved a party being bound or obliged to do 
something. For a liability to exist, there required to be a concursus of injuria and 
damnum, and such had not occurred until 2007 at the earliest. For there to be a 
‘contingent obligation’, there had to be some form of obligation, and no such 
obligation to the deceased had existed at the time of EKDC’s dissolution. In con-
sequence, Lord Brailsford dismissed the action against South Lanarkshire 
Council. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
By way of a preliminary observation, it should be immediately noted that the 
decision of Lord Brailsford dismissing the action against South Lanarkshire 
Council did not leave the pursuers without a remedy in this case: there were still 
three other defenders against whom the pursuers could proceed (the first alone 
being a company of substantial means). So, Lord Brailsford’s decision was not 
as catastrophic for the pursuers as it might otherwise have been. 
That preliminary observation aside, a number of things will be obvious 
about this decision. First, there is no reference in the judgment (or the reported 
pleadings of counsel it narrates) to the decision in Anton. It can only be as-
sumed that this is because, when counsel appeared before Lord Brailsford, the 
Anton decision had yet to be published (if it had, its omission from pleadings or 
judgment would be extraordinary). Second, it is to be noticed that the distinc-
tion in meaning drawn between ‘liabilities’ (contingent or otherwise) and ‘obli-
gations’ made by Lady Clark in Anton is not drawn by Lord Brailsford in this 
case. The legislation with which Lord Brailsford was dealing did not narrate, as 
two separate things to be transferred on the dissolution of EKDC, ‘liabilities’ and 
‘obligations’: instead it simply stated that (on the debit side) ‘liabilities’ were 
transferred. This clearly cast the debate in a different light. A legislative provi-
sion which distinguishes ‘liabilities’ from ‘obligations’ might be thought to give 
more scope to a pursuer to argue that a liability is something more provisional 
in law than an obligation; one which does not draw such a distinction makes a 
pursuer’s case harder, as a judge is more likely to assume (as Lord Brailsford 
does) that ‘liabilities’ and ‘obligations’ mean the same thing and that both in-
juria and damnum are required for either. Third, even though there is no distinc-
tion drawn between liabilities and obligations, it is perhaps somewhat disap-
30 
31 
32 
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pointing that neither of the cases discussed by Lady Clark are mentioned in Lord 
Brailsford’s judgment (they appear not to have been cited to him). Those cases 
clearly give a different character to the debate about the transfer of delictual 
liabilities to successor local authorities than does the one case discussed in any 
depth by Lord Brailsford on the subject of the meaning of ‘liabilities’, Liquidator 
of Ben Line Steamers Ltd, Noter.23  
In Ben Line Steamers, Lord Drummond Young discussed the concept of a 
‘contingent’ obligation, distinguishing it from a ‘pure’ and a ‘future’ obligation. 
As Lord Brailsford noted, Lord Drummond Young had opined in Ben Steamers 
that, for an ‘obligation’ to be contingent, there had to be some obligation in exis-
tence to begin with. However, the matter is not quite as clear cut as this. The term 
‘contingent obligation’ has been used in two distinct senses in Scots law. One is 
the sense identified by Lord Drummond Young – of a type of condition applying 
to an already constituted obligation – but there is a second sense in which the 
term has been used, namely to signify a condition which is suspensive of an ob-
ligation being undertaken at all, so that the very existence of the obligation is 
contingent. It was to this sense of ‘conditional obligation’ that Lord President 
Hope (citing the Scottish Institutional Writer Erskine) referred in Costain Building 
& Civil Engineering Limited v Scottish Rugby Union PLC24 when he said:  
 
Erskine states that a conditional obligation has no obligatory force until the condition is 
purified, because it is in that event only that the party declares his intention to be bound 
and consequently no proper debt arises against him until it actually exists. On his analysis 
the condition of an uncertain event suspends not only the execution of the obligation but 
the obligation itself. 
 
Clearly, the sense of ‘contingent obligation’ being argued for by the pursuers in the 
case under discussion was of this sort, not the sort referred to by Lord Drummond 
Young for, at the time of the transfer of liabilities to EKDC, a binding obligation on 
the part of the transferee to make reparation to the deceased in respect of meso-
thelioma would come into existence if, and only if, he went on to contract meso-
thelioma. Given that there is a perfectly respectable tradition in the law of describ-
ing this sort of case as a ‘contingent (or suspensive) obligation’, Lord Brailsford’s 
dismissal of the idea that such a possibility might reasonably be reflected in an in-
terpretation of the legislative provision before him must be open to criticism.25 
 
_____ 
23 2011 Scots Law Times (SLT) 535. 
24 1993 SC 650 at 654. 
25 It should be noted that Lord Brailsford previously adopted the same approach to the 
concept of a ‘contingent obligation’ in Grimshaw v Bruce [2011] CSOH 212. 
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Whether or not Lord Brailsford reached the correct decision, there is the 
problem of how to reconcile the decisions in Anton and Bavaird. The latter deci-
sion will have been unpopular with the families of mesothelioma victims. One 
might attempt to explain it away as based upon different legislative provisions 
than those governing the facts of Anton, but that would not assist victims sub-
ject to legislative provisions of the type in Bavaird. It is clearly undesirable for 
victims’ (or families’) abilities to sue to be dependent upon the precise wording 
used in whichever specific legislative provisions govern their case. Either the 
Inner House will have to find a way of ensuring a single interpretation of such 
provisions regardless of their precise wording,26 or else the Scottish Parliament 
may feel compelled to remedy the situation legislatively.  
 
 
5. Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council, Court of Session Outer 
House, 14 June 2012, [2012] CSOH 101, 2012 Scottish Civil 
Law Reports (SCLR) 620: Whether Road Traffic Accident the 
Result of a Breach of a Duty of Care on Roads Authority to 
Give Adequate Warning of Road Junction 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer was the driver of a car involved in a road traffic accident on a road 
(the A97) in rural Aberdeenshire on 8 May 2006. Her car collided with a van at a 
junction of the A97 when the pursuer, without giving way, drove straight on to 
the A97 from the smaller road on which she had been travelling, into the path of 
the van. The pursuer’s mother and aunt, passengers in her car, were killed; the 
pursuer was injured in the accident. 
The pursuer brought an action for damages in delict against the defenders, 
the local authority responsible for the maintenance of the road. She averred that 
the local authority had failed to post adequate signs or road markings indicating 
that the pursuer had been approaching a junction of the road at which she was 
required to give way; that what markings there were on the road had become 
indistinct and were not visible to the pursuer; and that a ‘Give Way’ sign was 
only visible to road users at the last minute, when it was too late to stop at the 
junction. The pursuer further averred: that the defenders had carried out an in-
spection of the junction in April 2006, and had planned to conduct certain re-
 
_____ 
26 An appeal in the Bavaird litigation was heard in July 2013. 
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pair works to the junction; that these had not occurred by the time of the acci-
dent; but that they had been carried out shortly after it (such works including 
the erection of a ‘Give Way’ sign in advance of the junction, and the re-marking 
of the road). The pursuer argued that the defenders owed her, as a user of the 
road, a duty to ‘devise, institute and maintain an effective system for the man-
agement of the roads for which they were responsible’ as well as a duty to ‘de-
vise, institute and maintain a reasonable system of installation, inspection and 
repair of the road signs and markings’ at the junction, and that they had 
breached these duties owed to her. The defenders argued in reply that, while as 
a matter of fact they undertook to repaint road markings in terms of a policy for 
the purpose of managing and maintaining public roads, they owed no duties of 
care to the pursuer of the sort alleged. They further alleged that the layout of the 
junction and its signage and markings gave adequate warning of its nature, and 
that the pursuer had shown insufficient care in approaching the junction.  
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Lord Uist, giving judgment in the case, referred27 to the well-known tripartite 
test for the imposition of a duty of care in delict (set out by the House of Lords in 
Caparo plc v Dickman28) which requires courts to have regard to the issues of 
(i) foreseeability, (ii) proximity, and (iii) fairness, justice and reasonableness, 
when considering whether or not to impose a duty of care upon a defender. His 
Lordship also considered in detail prior authority in relation to the duties of care 
on road authorities in relation to road signage and markings,29 as well as other 
cases where public bodies or officials had ‘taken control’ of a hazard and thus 
arguably come under a duty of care to members of the public in relation to the 
hazard. Having considered such authorities, and having had particular regard 
to the very similar prior case of Murray v Nicholls,30 Lord Uist held that the de-
fenders had not been under duties of the sort argued for by the pursuer.31 While 
an accident of the sort which had happened might have been reasonably fore-
 
_____ 
27 See Lord Uist’s judgment at para 8 f. 
28 [1990] 2 AC 605. 
29 Such prior authorities being: Bird v Pearce [1979] Road Traffic Reports (RTR) 369; Murray v 
Nicholls 1983 SLT 194; Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] 1 Weekly 
Law Reports (WLR) 1057. 
30 1983 SLT 194. 
31 See Lord Uist’s judgment at para 49. 
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seeable, that was insufficient for liability to be established. By painting lines at 
the junction because of the perceived risk of collisions, the defenders had not 
somehow imposed on themselves, retrospectively, a common law duty to paint 
the lines or, prospectively, to paint them back if they were obliterated.32 Fur-
thermore, by placing an order for the work to be done, the defenders did not 
come under any duty to which they were not subject before placing the order.33 
His Lordship consequently dismissed the action. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
Lord Uist’s judgment is consistent with the decision upon which he relies most 
heavily, Murray v Nicholls. Dating from 1983, that decision evidently pre-dates 
the enunciation of the tripartite test in Caparo, but Lord Uist believes that the 
judge in that case, Lord Stott, ‘effectively applied the Caparo test in reaching his 
decision’. What neither Lord Uist, nor Lord Stott, make particularly clear, how-
ever, is which of the two elements of Caparo other than foreseeability precludes 
liability in this sort of case: is it proximity, or is it ‘fairness, justice, and reason-
ableness’? The latter consideration has often been used to deny the imposition of 
common law delictual liability on public bodies in relation to the exercise by 
them of statutory functions (such as the statutory duty and related power appli-
cable to the defenders in this case34), on the ground that the imposition of a duty 
of care in respect of the exercise of such functions may have adverse conse-
quences for the way in which duties are discharged to the public as a whole, or 
because the imposition of such a duty would unreasonably interfere with the dis-
cretionary exercise of powers given to the authority. Something of that sort was 
alluded to by Lord Uist in this case, who mentions approvingly Lord Stott’s con-
cerns in Murray that the imposition of a duty of care in such a case might well 
lead to the undesirable consequence of duties being imposed in other circum-
stances, such as in relation to a failure to provide a pedestrian crossing. This ex-
ample, says Lord Uist, is effectively a ‘fair, just and reasonable’ consideration.35 
It seems then, though it is not entirely clear, that the court’s refusal to im-
pose a duty of care on the defenders in this case was the result of a belief that it 
 
_____ 
32 Para 46. 
33 Para 47. 
34 The defenders’ statutory duty to maintain public roads, and the related power to make 
improvements to them, is found in sec 1(1) of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984.  
35 See Lord Uist at para 45. 
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would not be fair, just or reasonable to do so (the third limb of the Caparo test). 
It would have been helpful to have had that conclusion more conclusively 
stated by Lord Uist, as it would have been helpful had his Lordship mentioned 
whether he saw the defenders as being in a proximate relationship with the pur-
suer or not. It would also have been useful to have seen some discussion of 
other issues raised in previous cases, such as whether or not the defenders’ fail-
ure to exercise its power to improve the road should be considered so ‘irrational’ 
as to impose a duty to act (it seems not), and the question of whether the ab-
sence of any mechanism in a statute for members of the public to seek redress 
for an alleged failure by a public body to fulfil a statutory duty mitigates for or 
against the imposition of a common law duty of care. Lord Uist omits any men-
tion of these matters, though they form part of the discussion in a number of the 
prior authorities to which he refers.36 
In short, though this judgment seems consistent with prior authorities, and 
reaches a conclusion which is not surprising given those authorities, the deci-
sion of the court is stated without as full a discussion of the important issues as 
one might have wished to have seen. 
 
 
6. Daly v Murray and Others, Court of Session Outer House, 
29 June 2012, [2012] CSOH 109: Action for Damages in 
Relation to Physical Abuse Subject to Triennium Limitation; 
No Sufficient Grounds for Exercise by Court of its Discretion 
to Waive Limitation 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer had, between the ages of 6 and 12, been resident at a children’s home 
run by the Poor Sisters of Nazareth in Aberdeen. The defenders in this action were 
the Poor Sisters Order, the Religious Superior of the Order during the period of the 
pursuer’s residence, and Aberdeen City Council (who were the statutory succes-
sors of the now dissolved Grampian Regional Council, who had been responsible 
for the supervision of the home and the placing of the pursuer there37). The pur-
 
_____ 
36 See for instance such discussion in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923. 
37 No question was raised in this case of any possible problem concerning the transfer of 
delictual liabilities to Aberdeen City Council of the sort raised in the cases of Anton and 
Bavaird, discussed at nos 17 ff and 27 ff above.  
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suer alleged that he had been subject to physical abuse and harsh punishments 
while he was a resident at the home, and in 2000 raised an action against the 
defenders for damages for the loss, injury and damage which he alleged he had 
suffered. Amongst other defences lodged by the defenders, they pleaded that 
the action was time-barred by virtue of the triennium limitation of actions in 
respect of personal injury imposed under sec 17 of the Prescription and Limita-
tion (Scotland) Act 1973 (‘the Act’). The pursuer argued that the triennium did 
not begin until May 1997 when he first became aware that (i) his injuries were 
sufficiently serious to justify his bringing an action for damages and (ii) the in-
juries were attributable in whole or in part to an act or omission of the defend-
ers. He further argued that, in the event that the action was time-barred, the 
court should exercise the discretion given to it under sec 19A of the Act to waive 
the time bar,38 and that the defenders would not be prejudiced by the court so 
doing.  
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Lord Drummond Young gave judgment in the case.39 His Lordship held that the 
action was time-barred as a result of the triennium, which in his opinion had 
begun to run at the date when the pursuer attained majority (20 October 1985).40 
A postponement of the triennium under the conditions mentioned in sec 17(2) of 
the Act was not applicable, as at the date when the pursuer attained majority 
the evidence indicated that he had been aware of the nature of his injuries and 
the fact that they were serious. He had only failed to take action earlier because 
he did not think, until 1997, that anyone would believe his story. Given his 
awareness of the nature and seriousness of the injuries he had suffered when he 
attained majority, this precluded a plea by the pursuer under sec 17(2) that he 
 
_____ 
38 Section 19A provides that the triennium may be disregarded by the court, and the action 
allowed, if ‘it seems equitable to the court’ to permit this. 
39 His Lordship had decided an earlier case of the same sort against the same defenders: B v 
Murray, 2005 SLT 982. 
40 Section 17(2) provides that the triennium runs either from the date when the injuries were 
sustained, or at such later date when the pursuer became so aware, or could reasonably 
practicably have become so aware, of the fact that (i) his injuries were sufficiently serious to 
justify his bringing an action of damages, (ii) they were the result of an act or omission, and 
(iii) the defender was the party to whom the act or omission was attributable. Section 17(3) 
adds the caveat that, in respect of injuries to minors, the calculation of the period specified in 
sec 17(2) is not to begin until the age of majority.  
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had not become aware of the seriousness of his injuries until 1997, and thus 
there could be no postponement of the running of the triennium. 
As to the question of an exercise by the court of its discretion under sec 19A 
to waive the triennium, Lord Drummond Young noted that previous cases dis-
closed a judicially adopted principle that, if there is a likelihood of significant 
prejudice to the defender as a result of the delay, this will usually result in a 
decision in favour of the defender, as well as a further principle that the passage 
of time may in itself result in significant prejudice to a defender. His Lordship 
did not agree that ‘the pursuer belongs to a particular category of persons who 
might be taken to be “silenced” as a result of childhood abuse’ such that mem-
bership of such class might reasonably justify a delay in their bringing of claims 
in respect of such abuse.41 The pursuer had provided no cogent explanation for 
the delay in bringing his claim, and there was a significant risk of prejudice to 
the defenders in an action being maintained so long after the events were al-
leged to have occurred and memories of them were likely to be unreliable.  
His Lordship added that, in relation to the case against Aberdeen City Coun-
cil, there were no sufficient averments by the pursuer of any fault on the part of 
the Council in placing the pursuer in Nazareth House, so that the case against 
them was in any event irrelevant. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
This case concerns the very sensitive question of historic child abuse committed 
many years ago against children whilst in residential accommodation or other-
wise under the care and supervision of non-family members. This troubling is-
sue is not confined to Scotland: many jurisdictions have had to deal with the 
question of liability in such cases, and most jurisdictions have some sort of 
‘statute of limitations’ which might conceivably prevent claims for abuse being 
brought many years after the time of the abuse. There was available to the court 
in this case a number of prior cases dealing with similar sorts of abuse and from 
which the court could thus seek guidance.  
The Scots law dealing with cases of time bar in relation to such claims for 
personal injury is doubly interesting from a legal point of view in that it con-
tains both a provision allowing for postponement of the start of the triennium 
limitation in cases where the victim lacks knowledge of the existence or seri-
 
_____ 
41 Para 18. 
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ousness of the injuries and of the fact that they have been caused by the act or 
omission of an identifiable defender, as well as a provision granting the power 
to courts to waive the triennium altogether in cases where it would be demon-
strably equitable to do so. These provisions are difficult to apply in the case of 
historic child abuse, however, for the reasons identified by Lord Drummond 
Young. In the case of the postponement provision, the very specific require-
ments permitting postponement do not seem apt to apply to many if not most 
cases of child abuse: most victims know that they have been the victim of seri-
ous injuries, but have simply been unwilling for many years to raise a claim 
out of fear of public shame, disbelief, or incredulity at their allegations. Recent 
events may well be changing victims’ attitudes towards making their abuse 
public, but do not change the fact that the terms of the relevant provision con-
cerning postponement of the triennium are not worded so as to allow post-
ponement merely because of a sense of guilt or a ‘culture of silence’ in the 
minds of victims. If a change of the law is needed, then it ought properly to 
derive from Parliamentary action rather a strained judicial reading of the exist-
ing law. 
Any change to the law would, of course, face the problem identified by Lord 
Drummond Young in his discussion of the provision allowing for a court to 
waive the triennium: the passage of time may seriously prejudice a defender’s 
entitlement to a fair trial. Memories may become very faded, reliable documen-
tary or forensic evidence may be lacking, witnesses may have died. The current 
law seeks to tread a difficult balance between protecting the rights of victims of 
personal injuries and the need to ensure alleged wrongdoers a fair trial. At pre-
sent, there seems to be no clear sense that Parliament feels the current balanc-
ing of these considerations is the wrong one, or that leaving it to courts to make 
the best assessment they can on the equities of waiving the time bar is not pro-
ducing generally fair results, even if that means that some vulnerable parties, 
such as the victims of child abuse, are left without a remedy.  
The best solution to this tricky issue may well be found in the change in vic-
tims’ attitudes which is already underway: a greater willingness to bring claims 
in a public climate where the victims of abuse are encouraged and supported, 
rather than shunned. In relation to the application of the present law under-
taken by Lord Drummond Young in this case, his Lordship’s conclusions seem 
to be sound ones based upon a body of cases42 supportive of his interpretation 
of the Act. 
 
_____ 
42 See eg, CG v Glasgow City Council 2011 SC 1; AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth 2007 SC 688; 2008 
Session Cases, House of Lords (SC (HL)) 146. 
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7. Board of Managers of St Mary’s Kenmure v East 
Dunbartonshire Council, Court of Session Outer House, 
27 December 2012, [2012] CSOH 198: Local Authority  
Liable in Delict to Owners of ‘Secure Units’ when Troubled 
Youngsters Rioted causing Damage to the Premises 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The unusual statutory background to this litigation is sec 10 of the Riotous Assem-
blies (Scotland) Act 1822 (‘the 1822 Act’), which provides (in its amended form) that:  
 
In every case where any damage or injury shall be done to any church, chapel, or building 
for religious worship, or to any house, shop, or other building whatsoever, or any fixtures 
attached thereto, or any furniture, goods, or commodities therein, by the act or acts of any 
unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous assembly of persons, or by the act or acts of any person 
or persons engaged in or making part of such unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous assembly, 
the party injured or damnified thereby shall be entitled to recover full compensation for 
the loss or injury, by summary action against the council (being a council constituted un-
der section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994) within whose area the loss 
or injury shall have been sustained; which action shall and may be brought before any 
competent court in Scotland. 
 
In March 2008, disturbances broke out at two ‘secure units’ to which troubled 
youngsters had been sent by the Children’s Panel (the body which determines 
the appropriate disposal of criminal conduct by those in Scotland too young to 
be tried as adults). Both premises suffered damage as a result of these distur-
bances. The owners and operators of the two secure units sought to recover the 
costs of the damage done from the defenders, the two local authorities in whose 
areas the secure units were located. The pursuers’ claims were based upon 
sec 10 of the 1822 Act. The defenders denied liability on the basis that the dis-
turbances which occurred at the units were not ‘unlawful, tumultuous or riot-
ous assemblies’ and, separately, that the provisions of sec 10 were not intended 
to indemnify parties who had custody of any party engaged in such assemblies. 
The court was therefore faced with the task of determining the proper interpre-
tation and application of sec 10 of the 1822 Act. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Temporary Judge Morag Wise, Queen’s Counsel (QC), giving judgment in the 
matter, held that the provision of the 1822 Act required to be interpreted against 
50 
51 
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a background of developments having taken place that were unforeseen at the 
time.43 The two issues facing her were (i) whether the words ‘the party injured’ 
might reasonably be taken as used by Parliament to include those owning or 
operating an institution whose inmates have rioted, and (ii) whether, in relation 
to the words ‘unlawful, tumultuous or riotous assembly’, the assembly requires 
to have a public content, given the historical background of the need to quell 
assemblies of the populace, usually those with a political aim, whose coming 
together became violent with consequent threat to disturbance of the public 
peace followed by actual damage. Following a historical and legislative survey 
of statutes dealing with riots, including the 1822 Act, and an examination of 
English law (including the important case of Yarls Wood v Bedfordshire Police 
Authority44), the judge held that (i) the words ‘the party injured’ were apt to in-
clude the owners and/or operators of an institution such as a secure residential 
unit in which young people are detained, and (ii) as it is not a pre-requisite of 
the Scottish criminal offence of mobbing and rioting that it take place in the 
street or some other form of public place, the formation of a group within a se-
cure residential unit for the purpose of unlawful and riotous acts causing dam-
age to property was capable of falling within the definition of ‘riotous assem-
bly’. 
The judge therefore ordered a proof before answer (a trial of the facts before 
application of the law to them) in relation to both claims. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
This judgment is of interest not only for the little known statutory provision 
which provides for, in essence, community compensation for property damaged 
during riots, but also for the challenge faced by the court in deciding how to 
interpret and apply a statute from 1822 on damage caused by riots to circum-
stances never envisaged by Parliament at the time (the ownership and operation 
of detention facilities by a party other than the Crown, and thus a party whose 
private law interests might be adversely affected by riotous behaviour by in-
mates of such facilities). While the judge noted that counsel were largely agreed 
that a ‘purposive interpretation’ ought to be applied to statutory provisions, 
 
_____ 
43 Para 38.  
44 [2010] QB 698, which concerned the permissibility of a claim under the Riot (Damages) Act 
1886 by a body of a similar sort to the pursuer in St Mary's Kenmure. In that case, the Court of 
Appeal held the claim to be permissible.  
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they were not so agreed on what consideration of the historical context and 
purpose of the Act meant for its application to an injured party who had control 
of the persons causing the damage, and to events not occurring in a public 
place.  
The judge’s decision of these two issues seems reasonable, given that (i) be-
cause the continuing purpose of the Act was to provide for compensation by the 
community (in the present form of the local authority) and not by those respon-
sible for maintaining law and order, there seems no good reason why (so long as 
the claimant under the Act is not in some sense a party to the riot45) a private 
party responsible for the custody of persons should not qualify for losses caused 
by rioters; and (ii) the crime of ‘mobbing and rioting’ need not occur in the 
street or some other form of public place: all that is necessary is that there be a 
‘realistic risk of [the conduct] being discovered’46 by the public (a description 
perfectly applicable to the facts before the judge). Both of these factors support 
the correctness of the judge’s decision in this case.  
 
 
8. French and Dempsie v Strathclyde Fire Board, Court of 
Session Outer House, 9 January 2013, [2013] CSOH 3: 
Breach by Employer of Common Law Duty of Care and  
of Strict Liability Duty under Employment Legislation 
towards Firefighters Employed by it 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
Two firefighters were injured during the course of their employment when 
brickwork above a doorway of a burning building which they had been in-
structed to force open by their watch commander collapsed on them. The fire-
fighters alleged that their employer (the defenders), and their superior officer, 
the Watch Commander, for whom their employers were vicariously liable, had 
been in breach both of (i) a common law duty of reasonable care owed to them 
 
_____ 
45 As the judge notes, a claim by a rioter himself would be excluded by the maxim ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio (see para 43 of the judgment). She also recognises, however, that a party 
having custody of rioters which failed to mitigate the damage caused in the riot (presumably by 
putting a swift and efficient end to it) might, after an examination of the facts of the case, not 
qualify for recovery (para 43). 
46 Harris v HMA, 2012 Justiciary Cases (JC) 245, para 25. 
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regarding their safety at work, in having instructed them to enter the building in 
an unsafe manner, as well as of (ii) the Personal Protective Equipment at Work 
Regulations 199247 and the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 
1988, in respect of the equipment given for their use. 
The defenders answered that (i) the type of injury suffered by the pursuers 
was not foreseeable by the Watch Commander, and in any event, that his ac-
tions had met the standard of care of a skilled firefighter exercising reasonable 
care, and (ii) that no evidence had been led that the defenders were in breach of 
the 1992 Regulations, and that, so far as the 1988 Regulations were concerned, 
there was no evidence that tools of the type supplied for use by the pursuers to 
open premises had ever caused injury to anyone before and therefore that the 
equipment supplied was ‘suitable for the purpose for which it [was] used or pro-
vided’, as the Regulations required. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Having heard expert evidence on the circumstances of the accident and of the 
nature of the equipment used, Lord Drummond Young gave judgment in the 
case. 
In relation to the common law case, he held that the two elements of crucial 
importance were foreseeability and the relevant standard of care,48 adding that, 
in assessing these elements, ‘[t]he probability of an event is clearly important, 
in the sense of the level of likelihood that it will happen’ and that also important 
was ‘the seriousness of the consequences if that event does in fact happen’.49 
His Lordship held that an accident of the type which had occurred had been 
reasonably foreseeable to the Watch Commander, and that the Watch Com-
mander had failed to exercise the care required of him (that being the care to  
be expected of ‘a skilled firefighter exercising reasonable care’50). In conse-
quence, the defenders were in breach of the common law duty owed to the fire-
fighters. 
In relation to the statutory claims (of strict liability), his Lordship held that 
there was evidence that the pursuer suffered relevant injuries in relation to the 
1992 Regulations, and also that the tools supplied to the firefighters were not 
 
_____ 
47 These Regulations were cited only by the second pursuer in his case. 
48 See para 37 of his judgment. 
49 Para 37. 
50 Para 41. 
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suitable as required by the 1988 Regulations, and that, in consequence, liability 
was also established under these Regulations. 
Lord Drummond Young held the defenders liable to pay the first pursuer 
£ 113,000 and the second pursuer £ 332,500 (such amounts having been agreed 
by the parties). 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
This judgment is perhaps most interesting in what it says about the level of care 
required at common law to be shown by a supervising fire officer (the Watch 
Commander) in respect of the firefighters operating under him or her at the 
scene of a fire. Lord Drummond Young identified the requisite standard of care 
as that of ‘a skilled firefighter exercising reasonable care’. His Lordship added 
that there had been some debate before him of whether the relevant standard 
was either that of an ordinary employer or else a version of the test for profes-
sional negligence laid down in the famous Scottish case of Hunter v Hanley.51 His 
Lordship was unwilling to concede that there was a strict dividing line between 
these two tests, such that individuals might fall clearly into one camp or the 
other:  
 
‘In my opinion there is no sharp dividing line between these tests; there is rather a spec-
trum of situations ranging from a case where the person responsible for safety has clear 
professional or technical qualifications to cases where he has no particular qualifications 
but is under an ordinary common law duty of care. The extent to which specialist exper-
tise must be brought to bear will vary according to the circumstances of the particular 
case.’52  
 
Such an approach might be said to have the benefit that it recognises that there 
are occupations and undertakings which, while not strictly professions, none-
theless involve the exercise of a high degree of skill and care which tends to-
wards the professional standard, if not strictly falling under it. Clearly, in Lord 
Drummod Young’s view, a Watch Commander at the scene of an emergency 
 
_____ 
51 1955 SC 200. The test established in the case comprises three elements: (1) it must be 
proved that there is a usual and normal practice in the profession in question; (2) it must be 
proved that the defender did adopt that practice; and (3) it must be established that the course 
the defender adopted is one which no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he 
had been acting with ordinary care. 
52 Para 41. 
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falls into that middle ground. As His Lordship commented of the standard to be 
expected of the Watch Commander:  
 
‘That is not a professional qualification, and accordingly the Hunter v Hanley test does  
not apply in its ordinary form. Nevertheless this standard does require the officer in 
charge to exhibit a special level of skill and care, which differs from that of an ordinary 
employer.’53  
 
It may be questioned however whether this conclusion justified Lord Drum- 
mond Young’s view that there is no sharp dividing line between the test for pro-
fessional negligence and the test for ordinary negligence. While the law doubt-
less accepts that those in the non-professional class might be required to act 
with either an ordinary or a ‘special’ level of care, as the circumstances dictate, 
the reported decisions on professional negligence continue to emphasise a 
characteristic of professional practice (not emphasised in this case) which mer-
its, in the view of the courts in general, the special treatment of professional 
negligence cases: the idea that there may be a number of reasonable ways in 
which a member of a profession may undertake certain professional tasks, there 
being no single or uniform way of properly undertaking such a task. This is the 
defining quality of the professional negligence test, and not simply the use of 
‘specialist expertise’. Whether a separate test for professional negligence should 
continue to be deployed may merit debate, but there was no reason for it to be 
challenged by Lord Drummond Young in this case: as he rightly decided, it may 
be entirely appropriate to hold someone such as a Watch Commander of a fire 
station to a special level of skill and care appropriate to his rank, responsibility 
and experience, to which it would not be appropriate to hold an ordinary fire-
fighter.  
Despite the remarks made by Lord Drummond Young, this judgment ought 
not to be seen as casting any serious doubt on the continued division between 
the ordinary and professional tests of negligence. 
 
 
 
_____ 
53 Para 41. 
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9. Ruddy v Chief Constable of Strathclyde and the Lord 
Advocate, United Kingdom Supreme Court, 28 November 
2012, [2012] UKSC 57: Procedural Propriety of Conjoining 
Two or More Defenders in an Action combining Claims  
for Damages in Delict and for Damages for Breach of an 
ECHR Right 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
The pursuer alleged that he had been assaulted by a number of police officers 
employed by Strathclyde Constabulary. The first defender was sued for dam-
ages in delict on the basis that he was, as the employer of the police officers, 
vicariously liable for their conduct. The pursuer further argued that (i) the 
conduct of the officers constituted degrading treatment which violated the 
pursuer’s rights under art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
(ii) the police force had failed properly to investigate the matter following a 
complaint by the pursuer to the Police Complaints Branch; and (iii) this failure 
to investigate amounted to a further breach of the pursuer’s art 3 rights. The 
second defender, who was responsible for all criminal prosecutions in Scot-
land, was also sued as having breached the pursuer’s art 3 rights by wrong-
fully failing to prosecute the offending police officers. The pursuer argued that 
both defenders ought to be found ‘severally’ liable for the damages sought. 
The pursuer failed in his claim at first instance before the Sheriff, and on ap-
peal before the Sheriff Principal (who removed the second defender from the 
action). The pursuer further appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Ses-
sion, who rejected his appeal on the procedural ground that it was improper 
for a pursuer who was suing two or three defenders for separate causes of ac-
tion to put into his summons a claim for a lump sum coupled with a request 
that the court split up such lump sum and give a several decree for whatever 
amounts the court thought proper. The pursuer appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Inner House’s characterisation of the 
action. Lord Hope, delivering the leading judgment, said that this was not a 
case where a pursuer was seeking to hold separate defenders liable for a single 
lump sum. There were two claims in which the pursuer was seeking an award of 
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damages: the first claim, based on allegations of assault at common law and a 
breach of the substantive obligation under art 3, was directed against the Chief 
Constable only; the second claim, based on allegations that the procedural obli-
gation under art 3 had been breached, was directed against the Chief Constable 
and the Lord Advocate. In Lord Hope’s view, it was clear that the two claims 
related to separate wrongs, committed at different times by different people, 
and that the pursuer was not asking for the defenders to be found liable for a 
single lump sum in respect of these separate wrongs. His Lordship therefore 
held that the objection to the competency of the action was misconceived and 
should be rejected.  
The Supreme Court ordered the case to be returned to the Inner House for 
an appeal against the Sheriff Principal’s decision on the substance of the law to 
be heard.  
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
This case raises a point of procedural rather than substantive law, and for that 
reason was not included in last year’s Yearbook. However, as the case is the 
only Scots one with any delictual element in it to go before the Supreme Court in 
2012, it seems appropriate to mention it briefly at this point. 
Though the point raised is a procedural one, it is of some practical signifi-
cance. There are many instances of wrongdoing where a number of wrongdoers 
may be alleged to have harmed a victim through the commission of more than 
one instance of delictual conduct. Courts are somewhat wary of the difficulties 
which may arise from conjoining all of the claims in such cases into a single 
action, but this decision serves as a reminder that doing so is not improper so 
long as the pursuer specifies the damages sought in respect of each separate 
wrong (doing so avoids the rule, established from the cases, that one pursuer 
cannot claim from two or more defenders, in respect of separate wrongs, a lump 
sum of damages and ask a court to split up such lump sum by giving a several 
decree against the various defenders for such amount as the court thinks 
proper54). As noted above, the Supreme Court did not think that a lump sum was 
being asked for here, so the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. While recognis-
ing the appropriateness of this rule, in his judgment Lord Hope issued a re-
 
_____ 
54 As to this rule, see eg: Ellerman Lines Ltd v Clyde Navigation Trs, 1909 SC 690; Barr v 
Neilson (1868) 6 Macpherson (M) 651; Maclaren, Court of Session Practice, 266. 
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minder about the limits to which procedural arguments should curtail the abil-
ity of pursuers to seek redress before the courts: 55 
 
The guiding principle, where an objection to competency is taken on these grounds, is 
whether the way the action is framed is likely to lead to manifest inconvenience and injus-
tice. The court must, of course, seek to be fair to all parties. It must take a pragmatic ap-
proach to the question whether the way the case is presented is so complex and discon-
nected that, despite the opportunities that exist for case management, it will not be 
possible to conduct the case in a way that meets the requirements of justice. The same is 
true if a motion is made for two actions to be heard together, or for two actions to be con-
joined. Each case will have to be looked at on its own facts. There is no absolute rule one 
way or the other, so long as the rule which says that it is incompetent for a pursuer to ask 
for a decree in a lump sum for separate wrongs is not broken. Rules of procedure should, 
after all, be servants, not masters, in matters of this kind.  
 
This is a useful guide for future courts dealing with complex delictual claims: 
the overarching consideration in such litigation is whether the conjoining of 
claims for separate wrongs against multiple defenders will adversely affect the 
ability of the court to do justice in the case. A proper specification of the nature 
of the individual wrongs alleged to have been committed by each defender, 
coupled with an avoidance of any claim by which the pursuer seeks to hold 
each defender liable for the totality of the harm suffered as a result of the sepa-
rate wrongs, should ensure that the aims of justice are served and that the so-
called ‘omnibus action’ may proceed.  
 
 
10. Personal Injury 
 
As in every other year, the majority of reported personal injury cases concerned 
road traffic accidents, cases of medical negligence, and actions in respect of 
injuries sustained at work.56 The latter class in particular raise issues of ‘health 
and safety’ legislation commented upon in earlier years. 
Apart from the cases in two of these three common categories discussed in 
detail earlier (Macdonald, a road traffic case, discussed no 36 ff above; Anton, 
Bavaird, French and Dempsie, all claims relating to workplace injuries, dis-
cussed in Cases 3, 4 and 8 (nos 17 ff, 27 ff, and 56 ff, respectively above), and the 
important new procedure for civil jury awards set out in Hamilton (discussed 
 
_____ 
55 Para 32. 
56 For two examples of employee claims, see McDougall v Emtec Building Services Ltd [2012] 
CSOH 90 and Winn-Pope v ES Access Platforms Ltd [2012] CSOH 87.  
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no 2 ff above), a number of other personal injury cases are worthy of note. 
McGlone v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2012] CSOH 190 is a good example of 
the complex and lengthy trials of factual evidence often required in personal 
injury damages (the litigation concerned injuries sustained during a hysterec-
tomy). Judgment in the case runs to 357 paragraphs and a number of appendi-
ces. Also of interest, particularly for litigants tempted to represent themselves, 
is Connelly v Whitbread plc [2012] CSIH 51, in which the Lord Justice Clerk, refus-
ing the injured party’s appeal, made some pertinent comments on some of the 
dangers that can arise when a party represents him- or herself.57 Future party 
litigants would do well to reflect on these words of warning. 
Further cases worthy of note last year include McGee v RJK Building Services 
Ltd [2013] CSOH 10 (of note for the helpfully set out quantification of damages in 
a claim by the family of a man who died as result of a fall down stairs caused by 
a faulty handrail installed at his home), Jackson v Murray [2012] CSIH 100 (an-
other road traffic accident, in which a teenage girl was knocked down having 
alighted from a school minibus, the court noting that the defender should have 
noticed that the minibus might have been a school one and thus have driven 
with a degree of caution appropriate in such a situation), Smith v James Strang 
Ltd [2012] CSOH 173 (in which the pursuer, who was injured at work while en-
gaged in carrying out fencing work for his employer, was held 50% contributo-
rily liable for his injuries), and Murphy v East Ayrshire Council [2012] CSIH 47 (an 
unsuccessful appeal against the decision reported in last year’s Yearbook by a 
wheelchair bound man, who, having unbuckled his seatbelt during the course 
of a journey in a minibus, was injured when the vehicle braked sharply; while 
the appeal court gave reasons somewhat different from those stated by the 
judge at first instance, they reached the same conclusion of no liability on the 
part of the defender). 
 
 
 
_____ 
57 The Lord Justice Clerk stated (at para 24): ‘In my opinion, the appellant’s lack of legal 
representation has been unfortunate for at least two reasons. The first is that it appears that 
certain of his witnesses whom he expected to be favourable to his case gave evidence 
favourable to the respondent. This clearly had an unsettling influence on the appellant at the 
proof and, I have little doubt, made his conduct of the case even more arduous. The second 
reason is that the appellant has placed before us certain evidence that he has found in the 
course of researches that he has carried out since the proof ... Unfortunately, this evidence 
comes before us far too late and is not the subject of a motion to have it received as res noviter 
veniens ad notitiam.’ 
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C. Literature 
 
1. Elspeth Reid, English Defamation Reform: A Scots 
Perspective, Scots Law Times (SLT) 2012 (News) 111–114  
 
This article examines the 2011 Consultation by the UK Ministry of Justice on the 
English law of defamation, and explores whether there are any lessons to be 
learned from it in relation to the Scots law of defamation. The author concludes 
that: (i) while the proposed English Bill would not be wholly appropriate as a 
basis for reforming Scots law, the English consultation has stimulated valuable 
debate which contains much of interest, and (ii) in preparing for any reform of 
Scots law, it would be appropriate both to clarify the law of ‘verbal injury’ as 
well as fundamentally to review the interests that defamation should seek to 
protect. 
 
 
2. William W McBryde, Contract Law: A Solution to Delictual 
Problems?, SLT 2012 (News) 45–48 
 
This article, by the author of the leading work on contract law in Scotland, pre-
sents some interesting reflections on the interaction between contract and 
delict. The author presents these reflections within the context of an historical 
development of delict law since Donoghue v Stevenson, reminding the reader 
that there was a contract between the cafe owner in that case and Mrs 
Donoghue’s friend. Such a contract might, under Scots law, have been argued to 
give rise to a third party right (jus quaesitum tertio), and contractual options 
were possible avenues of redress in later delict cases too. The author seeks to 
remind delict lawyers not to forget contractual options when they are pleading 
cases. This short article serves as a useful reminder of the interface between the 
two obligations of contract and delict, especially in Scotland with its long tradi-
tion of third party rights and its recognition of gratuitous contracts. 
 
 
3. Andrew Hajducki, Informing the Jury: A Critical Look at a 
Five Bench Decision, SLT 2012 (News) 145–150 
 
In this article, the author considers the Inner House’s decision in Hamilton v 
Ferguson (discussed no 2 ff above). The author argues that there is a widespread 
feeling that the judgments perhaps raise more questions than there are satisfac-
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tory answers for. Some of what is suggested by the author as being uncertain 
about the new guidance will likely however be settled quite swiftly by judicial 
usage and practice, and the author’s remarks do not seem to undermine the 
fundamental good sense of the reform instituted by the Inner House. 
 
 
4. Martin Hogg, Liability for Improperly Rejected Contract 
Tenders: Legitimate Expectations, Contract, Promise and 
Delict, Edinburgh Law Review 16 (2012) 246–253 
 
The author examines the question, inter alia, of whether a party inviting tenders 
for a contract may be in a proximate relationship to the tenderer for the pur-
poses of liability for pure economic loss in delict. While any such liability was 
peremptorily denied in the recent case of Petition of Sidey Ltd for Judicial Review 
of a Decision of Clackmannanshire Council,58 the author argues that the matter 
should have been subject to greater scrutiny by the court, and explains ele-
ments of such a pre-contractual relationship which might be characterised as 
demonstrating sufficient proximity for the purposes of delict.  
 
 
5. Craig Callery, A Note on the Recent Changes to Jury Trials, 
Juridical Review 2012, 315–318  
 
The author offers a short summary of the changes to the evaluation of damages 
awards by civil juries in the light of the decision of the Inner House in Hamilton 
v Ferguson (discussed no 2 ff above). The author is cautious as to whether these 
judicially imposed changes will improve the perceived problems concerning 
jury awards. 
 
 
 
_____ 
58 [2011] CSOH 194. 
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